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According to de Ronde it was Bohr’s interpretation of Quantum Mechanics
(QM) which closed the possibility of understanding physical reality beyond
the realm of the actual, so establishing the Orthodox Line of Research. In this
sense, it is not the task of any physical theory to look beyond the language and
metaphysics supposed by classical physics, in order to account for what QM de-
scribes. If one wishes to maintain a realist position (though not nave) regarding
physical theories, one seems then to be trapped by an array of concepts that
do not allow to understand the main principles involved in the most successful
physical theory thus far, mainly: the quantum postulate, the principle of inde-
termination and the superposition principle. If de Ronde is right in proposing
QM can only be completed as a physical theory by the introduction of ‘new
concepts’ that admit as real a domain beyond actuality, then a new ontology
that goes beyond Aristotelian and Newtonian actualism is needed. It was al-
ready in the early 20th century that misunderstood philosopher Alexius von
Meinong proposed a Theory of Objects that admits a domain of being beyond
existence-actuality. Member of the so called ‘School of Brentano’, Meinong’s
concerns were oriented to provide an ontology of everything that can be thought
of, and at the same time an intentionality theory of how objects are thought
of. I wish to argue that in Meinong’s theory of objects we find the rudiments of
the ontology and the intentionality theory we need to account for QM’s basic
principles: mainly the possibility of predicating properties of non-entities, or in
other words, the possibility of objectively describing a domain of what is, that
is different from the domain of actual existence.
Introduction
The wonder of Newtonian physics has many facets. It is not only a ‘useful’
theory we can apply to calculate velocities, accelerations, falls; it is not only
a theory that allows us to perform experiments or to pose questions about
how things are, given some conditions, or how things would be, given some
others. It is also, and maybe mainly, a theory that allows us to understand
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the world in which we live in. Of course, not all physicists or philosophers are
realists, who commit themselves to the thesis that holds that the terms of
the theory actually refer to independent entities in the world. But, beyond
the realism debate, I believe it to be without doubt that classical mechanics
is a complete theory that allows us to understand reality, by offering certain
concepts that seem to describe the macroscopic world we inhabit. Even
if there is no independent reality where Newtonian particles collide and
interact, that picture of the world seems to hold true when we inquire into
certain domains of nature. So strong is said picture of the world, that it
seems impossible to think beyond the concepts of Newtonian physics.
It is in this sense, I believe, that Quantum Mechanics (QM) is said to
lack a consensus regarding its interpretation. What does it mean, for a the-
ory that possesses a successful mathematical formalism, and unprecedented
levels of empirical adequacy, to be without a unanimous interpretation?
This means, basically, that “if we are to understand QM as a physical the-
ory, and not merely as a mathematical or algorithmic structure, it is clear
that we still need to provide a link between the mathematical structure and
a set of physical concepts which are capable of providing a coherent account
of quantum phenomena” (de Ronde, 2015A:8). In other words, we do not
know what the theory is about. QM has a rigorous formalism, empirical ad-
equacy, and outstanding technological applications, but it lacks still those
concepts that allow us to form a picture of the world, to think about the
‘reality’ described by the theory, to do physics in the most complete sense.
There is agreement in the literature, regarding the fact that QM possesses
indeed a successful formalism and adequate experimental arrangements,
even though we do not have the appropriate concepts to account for all of
this:
“(1) The only consensual part of the theory is a formal skeleton
enabling one to calculate the probability of various experimental
outcomes at any time, given the initial preparation (Peres, 1995;
Schwinger, 2001). (2) This formal skeleton is often complemented
with bits and pieces of former pictures of the world borrowed from
classical physics, but connected to one another in an unfamiliar
and unruly way. A recurring complaint is that, as long as we are
left without any truly coherent representation of the world and of
its ‘ontological furniture’ compatible with the quantum formalism,
we cannot claim that we truly ‘understand’ quantum mechanics”
(Bitbol, 2010:54-55)
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“Quantum mechanics brilliantly succeeds as a mathematical for-
malism: the numbers it provides are always successfully compared
with experimental results. But it is often said to fail as an explana-
tory theory allowing us to understand the laws of atomic processes”
(Lurat, 2007:230).
“Scientific advances can significantly change our view of what the
world is like, and one of the tasks of the philosophy of science is
to take successful theories and tease out of them their broader im-
plications for the nature of reality. Quantum mechanics, one of the
most significant advances of twentieth century physics, is an obvi-
ous candidate for this task, but up till now efforts to understand its
broader implications have been less successful than might have been
hoped. The interpretation of quantum theory found in textbooks,
which comes as close as anything to defining “standard” quan-
tum mechanics, is widely regarded as quite unsatisfactory. Among
philosophers of science this opinion is almost universal, and among
practicing physicists it is widespread. It is but a slight exaggera-
tion to say that the only physicists who are content with quantum
theory as found in current textbooks are those who have never
given the matter much thought, or at least have never had to teach
the introductory course to questioning students who have not yet
learned to ‘shut up and calculate!”’ (Griffiths, 2011:2).
“Regarding its formal structure we could say that quantum me-
chanics seems to be a ‘finished theory’. In terms of empirical ad-
equacy, it provides outstanding results, its mathematical struc-
ture —developed in the first three decades of the 20th century by
people like Werner Heisenberg, Pascual Jordan, Max Born, Erwin
Schro¨dinger and Paul Dirac— seems able to provide until now the
adequate modeling to any experiment we can think of. However,
apart from its fantastic accuracy, even today its physical inter-
pretation remains an open problem. In the standard formulation,
quantum mechanics assigns a quantum mechanical state to a sys-
tem, but ‘the state’ has a meaning only in terms of the outcomes
of the measurements performed and not in terms of ‘something’
which one can coherently relate to physical reality. It is not at all
clear, apart from measurement outcomes, what is the referent of
this quantum state, in particular, and of the formal structure, in
general. If we are to ask too many questions, problems start to pop
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up and simple answers seem doomed to inconsistency” (de Ronde,
2011:9)
Regardless of this agreement concerning the lack of a proper conceptual
scheme that would allow a comprehensive understanding of QM in terms
of a ‘physical reality’ of some sort, one could very well argue that this is
indeed a futile enterprise, one that should be abandoned in favor of a more
pragmatic or instrumentalist approach. Of this opinion are, for instance,
Fuchs & Peres (2000:1): “Contrary to those desires, quantum theory does
not describe physical reality. What it does is provide an algorithm for com-
puting probabilities for the macroscopic events (‘detector clicks’) that are
the consequences of our experimental interventions. This strict definition of
the scope of quantum theory is the only interpretation ever needed, whether
by experimenters or theorists”. So, we could ask ourselves, why bother with
finding concepts or an interpretation for a theory that is already providing
everything it should?
It is inevitable, in order to answer such a question, to make explicit
what one believes should be a physical or even a scientific theory. The in-
strumentalist approach simply decides to ignore the fact that the theory
—might— ‘lacks’ something, and wishes to pursue and insist in the al-
ready achieved successes of the theory. The interpretative ‘problems’ of the
theory, such as the measurement problem, the basis problem, non-locality,
non-separability. . . and the list goes on, are only set aside, swept under the
rug, to allow for the wonderful computations to carry on. To argue with a
position that does not acknowledge the existence of a theoretical problem
is a hard enterprise, given how the desiderata concerning a physical theory
are so different from one another. To them, I can only ask: is that all? Are
we to satisfy ourselves by claiming that the most successful scientific the-
ory produced by mankind is nothing more than an algorithm to compute
probabilities, with no reference whatsoever to physical reality? Can we re-
ally settle with a theory that has no comprehensive concepts, but opens
questions regarding nature and being we would choose never to answer?
To all of those who believe ‘no’ is the best answer for the posed questions,
and believe physics is more than an algorithm that computes the results of
the experiments we ourselves have designed, to all of those who yet believe
in some kind of physical reality to be known by human scientific endeavor,
a long road of problems lies ahead. I believe QM lacks concepts that would
allow us to comprehend the reality which its formalism already describes,
in the strong sense that implies that we need to find these concepts. For the
unconvinced instrumentalist who remains happy computing, the remainder
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of this article will seem pointless. To the one who shares the desideratum
of comprehending reality through physics, we need now to inquire into how
this could be approached.
I will begin by presenting a map of possible interpretations for QM and
I will argue in favor of the line of interpretations that states the need to
find new concepts for QM. In section 3, I will offer a brief presentation of
Meinong’s theory of objects, which I will apply, in section 4, to some of the
problematic issues of QM.
1. The interpretation of QM
The quest of conceptually comprehending QM until today can be presented,
following de Ronde (2011), in two main lines of inquiry: first, the tradition
that beginning with Bohr has tried to comprehend QM based on classi-
cal concepts and has tried to make the formalism compatible with basic
classical metaphysical principles; and second, another line of inquiry which
attempts to take the successful formalism as a starting point and so, tries
to find the appropriate metaphysical principles that would account for it:
“We believe that an interesting distinction that can help us to
understand the huge interpretational map of quantum mechanics
relates to the position one takes with respect to metaphysics. This
controversial relation between physics and metaphysics displaces
the problem of truth to a secondary stage and concentrates its
analysis in the conditions of possibility to access and distinguish
physical phenomena. Metaphysical schemes provide the coordinates
through which the representational map of realistic stances can be
developed. Among those who attempt to provide a metaphysical
account of quantum mechanics there is a first group that tries, in
different ways, to ‘restore a classical way of thinking about what
there is’. Staying close to at least some of the classical notions of
physics (space-time, causality, objects, etc.) these approaches have
no problem to give up the orthodox formulation of quantum me-
chanics. A second group also interested in the metaphysical ques-
tion regarding quantum mechanics attempts to begin ‘right from
the start’ with the successful mathematical formalism in its ortho-
dox form, trying to learn about its structure and internal features in
order to find a metaphysical scheme which is able to fit the formal-
ism. We might consider the first group as going from metaphysics
into the formal structure while the second group goes from the for-
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mal structure into the metaphysical scheme” (de Ronde, 2011:54).
The first path can be characterized, then, as that which attempts to
comprehend the new theory, QM, with the old concepts, the classical
Aristotelian-Newtonian ones. Bohr himself stated that “the unambiguous
interpretation of any measurement must be essentially framed in terms of
classical physical theories, and we may say that in this sense the language
of Newton and Maxwell will remain the language of physicists for all time”
(Bohr, quoted in de Ronde, 2011: 7). Probably one of the most famous
examples in this line of inquiry is Bohm’s hidden variable program, which
according to de Ronde, “is forced to change the formalism with seemingly
ad hoc moves; moves which can be only justified in relation to the prior
metaphysical commitments” (de Ronde, 2011:54-5).
The Bohr-inspired program that seeks to find an interpretation for QM
in the concepts and language of classical mechanics finds, among other
approaches, its philosophical grounds in an interpretation of Kantian tran-
scendental philosophy. Following Pringe’s interpretation, the general idea
is that the limits of possible experience require that a phenomenon be
constituted both through sensibility and understanding, that is, through
empirical intuitions and a priori concepts. Anything that falls out of these
limits is considered by Kant to be metaphysical and not subject to scientific
inquiry, inasmuch as it is beyond possible experience. According to Kant,
certain a priori conditions must be met in order for something to be an ob-
ject of possible experience: sensibility must provide the necessary empirical
intuitions which are synthesized by the faculty of understanding according
to the categories table. One of the most important elements in this table
is the concept of causality. So, according to Pringe’s Kantian reading of
Bohr’s interpretation of QM:
“If the quantum postulate is assumed, all pretension of reaching a
spatial-temporal representation, which is at the same time causal,
of an object subject to the postulate, must be abandoned. That
is, if an object is within the domain of validity of the postulate, it
won’t be possible —as it is in classical physics— to synthesize the
set of contingent data of a measurement, according to the concept
of cause, as the effect of said object, representing this in space and
time, in such a way that its states modify each other causally”
(Pringe, 2012:183).
This means that the quantum postulate forbids ‘quantum objects’ to be
objects of possible experience, inasmuch as it is not possible to synthesize
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the multiplicity of empirical data following the concept of causality. The
main problem of this conclusion lies in the fact that objectivity is then lost
for the quantum domain. So, how does QM remain a scientific theory, given
that it violates Kantian transcendental conditions of validity?
The Bohrian answer to this question, as it is known, is contextual-
ity. Within each experimental arrangement or measurement process, Bohr
argues, we can synthesize the given objects, meeting thus the necessary
conditions. The problem is, we cannot give a coherent account of the re-
sults of multiple experiments, since these immediately become incompatible
in terms of the Kantian categories. Pringe goes on to argue that quantum
phenomena must be described in classical terms, thus guaranteeing Kantian
transcendental conditions.
“In effect, quantum phenomena are contextual, given that their
validity is restricted to a determined type of experimental arrange-
ment, and they are complementary, inasmuch as they mutually
exclude one another; but at the same time, they are all necessary
to account for experimental evidence. We face, then, a multiplicity
of phenomena, whose objective character is established, but they
do not yet acquire systematic unity” (Pringe, 2012:188-9).
This systematic unity is, of course, a necessary condition for scientific
knowledge. So, quantum phenomena are given in terms of classical concepts
which are referred to specific and distinct experimental arrangements. Now,
each quantum phenomenon, from each arrangement, is incompatible, in
classical terms, with each other (in most of the cases). Though incompatible,
these results are mutually complementary, in the sense that they are all
necessary to account for the empirical data that the theory produces. So,
how can all these mutually incompatible and complementary results be
brought to systematic unity in order to guarantee the objective validity of
scientific knowledge?
“[. . . ] Bohr distinguishes quantum objects from quantum phenom-
ena, which are nothing more, than classical descriptions, whose to-
tality exhausts the available information regarding the firsts. The
systematic unity of quantum phenomena will only be reached when
they are subsumed under the concept of quantum object. [. . . ] The
concept of a certain quantum object or system contains the rep-
resentation of its state, and with it, the information about the
different probabilities of the different results of the possible mea-
surements that can be realized on the system. In this way, the
March 23, 2016 10:56 WSPC - Proceedings Trim Size: 9in x 6in meinong
8
multiple quantum phenomena are unified by a probabilistic law.
Given a certain quantum phenomenon, the representation of the
state of the quantum object establishes the probability of each and
every phenomena of the object. So, the multiplicity of phenomena
is synthesized through the concept of the object and subsumed un-
der it. This synthesis allows, then, to carry out predictions such
that, given a certain phenomenon, the probabilities of the differ-
ent results of possible measurements are calculated based on the so
called ‘wave function’ of the system” (Pringe, 2012:189).
The wave function then plays the role of the quantum object, which
can never be directly given into intuition neither can it be synthesized
according to the categories, but operates as the regulative systematic unity
of the different quantum phenomena which are in fact, given to intuition
and synthesized. The objective validity of QM is then grounded on the
objective validity of classical physics, the reason for this being that classical
concepts are the only ones that can attain objective validity. I shall quote
Pringe in extenso one last time to appreciate the conclusion of such an
analysis:
“In the first place, the objective validity of a classical object con-
sists in its synthetic function of an empirical multiple, thanks to
which, the intuitive representation of an object is constituted. On
the contrary, the objective validity of the concept of a quantum
object is based rather in its regulative task to provide systematic
unity to the complementary phenomena (whose objectivity is guar-
anteed by the use of classical concepts to interpret the experimental
results).
In second place, the concept of a classical object acquires objective
reality when a given empirical multiplicity is subsumed under the
concept thanks to the mediation of a scheme. So, the concept is ex-
hibited directly in intuition. On the contrary, as we have seen, as a
consequence of the quantum postulate, the conditions under which
an empirical multiplicity is given, which should be synthesized by
the concept of a quantum object, are incompatible with those con-
ditions under which the concept can be applied. Therefore, a direct
exhibition of such a concept in intuition is not possible. The con-
cept of a quantum object acquires objective reality, rather, through
an indirect exhibition in intuition, carried out through symbolic
analogies” (Pringe, 2012:192-3)
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We can now appreciate what it means, in philosophical terms, that quan-
tum mechanics can only be interpreted in terms of classical physics. These
Bohrian declarations can be grounded in Kantian transcendental philoso-
phy. What it means to be able to constitute an object is incompatible with
quantum theory. Thus, all that is left for QM is to settle with classical rep-
resentations, mutually incompatible, but mutually complementary. There
is no quantum object we can constitute, but this concept operates not in
a constitutive manner, but a regulative one, providing systematic unity
to the multiple phenomena, presented in classical terms, through symbolic
analogies.
In other words, we could say that the Bohrian interpretation of QM that
seeks to understand QM in terms of classical concepts is right, if Kantian
transcendental philosophy is also right. That is, it makes no sense to pursue
new constitutive concepts for QM if the limits established in Kant’s Critique
of Pure Reason are indeed the a priori limits of what can be constituted
by human thinking. All that is left is the possibility of finding metaphysical
concepts, which would perform a regulative role, but not a constitutive
one. This is, clearly, one possibility: but it implies that we must always find
objective validity for these concepts, as Pringe says, ‘indirectly’. Now, of
course, we must ask ourselves, why should we trust Kant? The most direct
way to ‘refute’ Kant’s limits to human experience would be to find new
limits to experience that are compatible with the quantum principles. But,
again, why seek them if one thinks Kant is right about them? It would seem
we need further motivation to enter such an enterprise.
It can be argued that we find in Kant the philosophical grounding for
classical mechanics∗. The space, which is the empty form of sensibility ac-
cording to Kant, is the space of Euclidean geometry, which is, at the same
time, the absolute space of Newtonian physics. The pure concept of causal-
ity, under which we synthesize phenomena and constitute objects of ex-
perience according to Kant, is the concept of causality that is needed for
classical mechanics’ descriptions of macroscopic interactions between bod-
ies. These could be the transcendental limits of human experience. But
they could also very well be the transcendental limits of classical experi-
ence. Why should these be the limits of all human experience? One may
∗Regardless of whether or not Kant took Newtonian mechanics and Euclidean geome-
try as starting points for his theory, and regardless of whether or not these principles
are needed for Kantian philosophy, the truth is that they seem highly compatible and
that history, specially neo-kantism, has taken Kantian philosophy as a transcendental
fundament for physics.
March 23, 2016 10:56 WSPC - Proceedings Trim Size: 9in x 6in meinong
10
argue that both the appearance of Relativity Theory and QM are sufficient
reason to believe that we need new limits for human experience†. We need
a new ontology that is not grounded on classical metaphysical principles.
Another approach to a Kantian interpretation of QM is found in Michael
Bitbol’s work. The French author wishes not to accept the fixed given limits
of experience developed by Kant, but to embrace his ‘reflective metaphysical
program’ in order to analyze the different problems that arise from quantum
theory. In this sense, the task is not to limit experience to Kant’s words,
but to inquire once again into the limits of human experience, based on the
new developments brought about by QM:
“Kant’s motto is that, despite its stemming from the “extravagant
claims of speculative reason” (Kant, 1997, Introduction), meta-
physics should not be rejected but disciplined. It should be given
an epistemological rather than ontological status, so much so that
ontology itself is seen as an epistemological tool. At the very end of
Kant’s work of reconstruction, metaphysical statements are then
no longer seen as representations of something “out there”, but
as rules in a grammatical pre-ordering of experience. [. . . ]Hence,
metaphysics becomes nothing else than a reflective analysis of the
powers and credence of reason” (Bitbol, 2010:59).
In this way, metaphysics is not seen as an objective description of an
independently existing reality, but as a way to determine the possibility of
knowledge. Given QM’s ‘new knowledge’, one might argue, we need meta-
physics to establish its conditions of possibility:
“One can thus adopt a pragmatic definition of the a priori instead
of a purely intellectual one (Pihlstrm, 2003). According to this defi-
nition, an a priori form is no longer a universally necessary intellec-
tual condition for objective knowledge, but a pragmatic condition
locally and provisionally necessary for the determination of some
intersubjectively shared domain of experimental or technological
intervention” (Bitbol, 2010:62).
So Kant’s all-limiting a priori becomes, under this new perspective, a
contextual limitation to specific cases of knowledge. The task of a reflec-
tive metaphysics is not any more, then, to establish the limits of possible
†Of course, no a posteriori theory or evidence could refute a priori arguments. The point
is that now, there seems to be reason enough to believe that those limits set by Kant
are indeed to narrow.
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knowledge for all human cognitive activity, but rather, to describe the a
priori elements that are at stake in each context.
“This being granted, a solution (or rather dissolution) of the mea-
surement problem boils down to finding a way to articulate the
indefinite chain of relational statements of the quantum theory to
the absolute statements that are used in experimental work. An
articulation of this kind can easily be found, provided one realizes
that the latter absolute statements are in fact indexical; provided
one realizes that these statements are only ‘absolute’ relative to us,
to our scale, to the open community of experimenters to which we
belong (Rovelli, 1996 ; Bitbol, 2008). At this point, one is bound to
realize the ineliminability of situatedness from the apparently neu-
tral descriptions of quantum mechanics, and to accomplish thereby
the reflective move typical of Kant’s renewed definition of meta-
physics” (Bitbol, 2010:75).
So the measurement problem is ‘dissolved’ because we come to the un-
derstanding that the ‘absolute statements’ of QM are in fact relative state-
ments, the term of the relation being the community of scientists. The
‘pragmatic a priori ’ means nothing else than the explicitation of the meta-
physical principles that underlie each experimental arrangement. Since each
of these is in fact produced by the community itself, all that remains is to
acknowledge this fact and consider QM as interpreted in our own terms:
“But in quantum physics, no event should be ascribed autonomy.
In this case, every event is tantamount to an observable value as-
cription, and an observable is only defined relative to an effective
instrumental possibility of assessing it. In quantum physics, the in-
strumental context is not only a way of getting access to an event;
it is a way of generating it” (Bitbol, 2010:78).
So, according to this pragmatic a priori, we are to settle ourselves with
no more than the conditions of possibility of a given situation, which coin-
cides with the fact that we determine ourselves the conditions for a given
experimental arrangement. There is nothing beyond that situation and the
so called ‘paradoxes’ of QM are dissolved inasmuch as they no longer con-
stitute a problem, if we accept that each measurement is situated :
“This represents a major difference with classical physics. In clas-
sical physics, the simple truth that we act as situated subjects
of knowledge could be bracketed, and a naturalized description of
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the world including ourselves taken as objects could pretend to be
universal. Instead, quantum physics manifests the bounds of this
attitude of all-pervasive naturalization. It makes one realize that
the irreducible fact of situatedness is a necessary presupposition
of objective knowledge and cannot thus be objectified itself. This,
of course, was pointed out by many generations of transcenden-
tal philosophers, from Kant to Husserl and beyond; but quantum
physics leaves little room for those who want to ignore their lesson”
(Bitbol, 2008:212).
In my opinion, Bitbol’s so called transcendental interpretation of QM
boils down to a sophisticated defense of an instrumentalist position. To as-
cribe Husserl or Kant such a conception is as fair as believing we have come
any closer to an understanding of the problems involved in QM, because
we call “pragmatic a priori” the renounce of a realist program for QM.
Kant believed that the a priori concepts of pure understanding referred to
actual, existing, independent reality, by way of the empirical intuitions that
are synthesized under such concepts. Husserl believed that the constitution
of phenomena in natural attitude is guided by the world itself, and that in
ultimate stance, the question about how phenomena are constituted is the
question as to why the subjective constitution of phenomena is valid, in the
sense that it corresponds with the reality ‘out there’. The whole point of
the transcendental question into the conditions of possible experience is to
determine in a universal manner how it is that we know the world. There is
nothing transcendental, in any relevant sense, in the claim that we generate
an instrumental context each time we perform an experiment.
Pringe’s reading of Bohr’s interpretation is based on a solid understand-
ing of Kantian philosophy. My only criticism to it is that, while Kant’s
philosophy successfully grounds in transcendental conditions classical me-
chanics, it fails to bring us any closer to an understanding of QM and closes
the door for any project that seeks to really empower QM by acknowledg-
ing that the success of the theory should be taken seriously. We cannot
understand QM, know what the theory is talking about, if we try to force
it into old schemes, and settle with ‘symbolic analogies’. The question of
what does QM talk about, needs to be taken seriously, instead of trying to
explain why the question cannot be answered.
On the other hand, Bitbol’s position falls short of being transcendental
or realist in any relevant sense. If anything, it is an elaborate account of the
claim that QM needs no interpretation: because we are situated, we cannot
escape our situation, and therefore must settle with a contextual reading
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of the results of QM, that denies them any kind of autonomy, validity and
even reality.
Let us now move into the second group of interpretations of QM, that
which wishes to find the proper metaphysical principles for QM taking as
a starting point the successful formalism, and which wishes to do so not in
instrumentalist terms, neither in nave realist terms, but in the sort of real-
ism that takes into consideration the fact that scientific theories represent
reality, a reality that exists out there, but that we can only access through
a certain array of concepts. De Ronde calls this a “Representational Realist
Stance”, and defines it as follows:
“A representational realist account of a physical theory must be
capable of providing a physical (and metaphysical) representation
of reality in terms of a network of concepts which coherently relates
to the mathematical formalism of the theory and allows to make
predictions of a definite field of phenomena (expressed through such
concepts)” (de Ronde, 2015:12-3).
We can take, then, the realist stance and the search for a new ontology
of QM as two fundamental desiderata in the quest of interpreting QM. If
we do so, we can better see what the problem is with interpretations that
still seek to keep the classical concepts for QM. The argument is simple: it
is the theory which tells us how to understand reality and what is and is
not out there. Physical theories are based on metaphysical principles which
are adopted without question and, of course, without possible scientific
justification, since they are the basic principles upon which the concepts of
the scientific theory are developed. In the case of physical theory, de Ronde
argues, we are still trapped by Aristotle’s basic metaphysical principles:
the Principle of Existence, which determines that an entity, that which
exists, can only do so only in spatio-temporal way; the Principle of Non-
Contradiction, which forbids the attribution of contradictory properties to
anything that exists, since it assumes that reality is in itself of a non-
contradictory nature; and the Principle of Identity, which asserts that an
entity is identical to itself, and that its essential properties are maintained
through time. The basic assumption in Aristotelian metaphysics and later
in Newtonian, taken to the extreme, is that everything that is, all that
exists, can only do so for real, in actuality. In other words, there is only one
real existent mode of being: the mode of actuality:
“The general metaphysical principle implied by the understanding
of Newtonian mechanics, that ‘Actuality = Reality’, has become an
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unquestionable dogma within physics. As a silent fundament all of
physics has been developed following the metaphysics of actuality.
And even though QM was born from a deep positivist deconstruc-
tion of the a priori classical Newtonian notions -and in this sense
the philosophy of Mach can be understood as the very precondi-
tion for the creation of both QM and relativity theory- it was very
soon reestablished within the limits of classical metaphysics itself.
The constrains of actuality have been unquestionably accepted by
philosophers of physics either in terms of hic et nunc observation
(empiricism and its variants) or as the mode of preexistence of
properties (realism). Both positions have remained captive of actu-
alism; trapped in the metaphysical net designed (through the PE,
PNC and PI) by Aristotle around the 5th century before Christ
and imposed by Newton in the 18th Century of our time. Actual
(preexistent) properties and actual (here and now) observations are
two sides of the same (metaphysical) coin” (de Ronde, 2015:20)
All attempts to understand QM have been precluded to do so, due to
the limitations imposed by such a metaphysic, “But what if QM cannot be
subsumed under the metaphysical equation imposed by Newtonian physics:
Actuality = Reality?” (de Ronde, 2015:21-2). If that is the case, and it is
the unquestioned presupposition that reality can only be in the mode of
actuality which has prevented a successful interpretation of QM, then a
new path is clear ahead:
“We need to develop a new way of understanding reality beyond
the ruling of actuality. To escape the ruling of actuality —both
in terms of hic et nunc observation and pre-existent properties—
means to abandon, on the one hand, the idea that we have a clear
definition of what is observed according to QM, and on the other
hand, the idea that actuality is the only possible way to conceive
and understand physical reality. Our strategy is to take as a stand-
point the formalism and its predictive power in order to develop
new physical concepts which relate coherently to the formalism
and can allow us to think about the physical meaning of quantum
phenomena.” (de Ronde, 2015:23-4).
The project then comes to light. To search for new concepts for QM
means to develop a new ontology. A new ontology is not the same as new
ontic categories. The task is not to expand the list of what there is, but to
rethink the principles under which we claim that something is or can be.
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The principle that underlies all previous metaphysical endeavors and, there-
fore, all attempts to find a proper conceptualization of QM, seems to be the
principle that equates reality to actuality. Two things are then needed to
carry on forward: a new ontology that does not reduce reality to what is ac-
tual, and a new theory of experience that allows us to understand how such
a domain of reality, which is not actual, could be thought of, experienced.
In other words, we need a new ontology and ‘a new’ phenomenology.
2. Meinong’s Theory of Objects.
In this section I wish to offer a schematic presentation of philosopher Alexius
von Meinong’s Gegestandtheorie or theory of objects. Based on the conclu-
sion of the previous section regarding the need for a “new ontology” that
would allow to fully grasp the principles of QM, I believe Meinong’s ontol-
ogy is a good place to start. Meinong is a disciple of Austrian philosopher
Franz Brentano, who can be considered to have founded a philosophical
school, the so called “School of Brentano”, of which I wish to recover one
main principle that appears clearly in Meinong’s philosophy and is relevant
for the present purposes‡. The key point of Brentano, or at least of the
‘Brentanian philosophers’, is the correlation between the psychological and
the ontological.
Brentano’s reading of Aristotelian realism leads him to consider that
there is a parallelism between mental acts and their objects, one the one
hand, with objects ‘in themselves’, on the other. The crucial thesis is that
those objects as they are, unlike Kant’s nomena, are given to the mind and
can be fully known. Thus, philosophy is the inquiry both into the mental
acts and its correlates (psychology), and into objects and their nature as
such (ontology). In the words of Barry Smith:
“Descriptive psychology, as Brentano here understands it, seems to
consist precisely in a psychology that will issue in an ontologically
sophisticated theory of the different types of parts, of such a sort
that the specification of parts will be at the same time a speci-
fication of the ways in which these parts are fitted together into
wholes” (Smith, 1994:47)
A psychological investigation, thus, would yield as results not only in-
‡For a comprehensive reading on the philosophy of Brentano and its disciples, see: Smith,
Barry (1994), Austrian philosophy. The legacy of Franz Brentano, Open Court Publish-
ing Company, Chicago and LaSalle, Illinois.
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formation regarding mental acts themselves and consciousness as such, but,
inasmuch as investigating the mental correlates of mental acts is investigat-
ing objects, it would also yield the ontological information of the objects
as they are.
Historically speaking, this parallelism found in Brentano’s theory, was
inherited by most (if not all) of his disciples, who later focused in different
domains of inquiry. In the case of Meinong, the disciple who interests us
here, this was translated into a theory of objects which is, as we will see in
a moment, both a theory of objects as they can be thought of, as well as a
theory of objects as they are or can be:
“For where Brentano applied his descriptive realist method almost
exclusively in the area of psychology, his students extended it in
systematic ways to other domains of inquiry. We can in fact dis-
tinguish in their work three branches of what might be called ‘de-
scriptive ontology’: the ontology of things (or objects in the narrow
sense), the ontology of states of affairs, and the ontology of values,
a tripartite division which flows in an obvious way from Brentano’s
tripartite division of acts.
The ontology of things or objects arises when one turns from
the psychology of presentation to an investigation of the non-
psychological correlates of presenting acts. ‘Object’ is then under-
stood as: ‘possible correlate of presentation’ ” (Smith, 1994:52).
In order to make clear how this tripartite division follows obviously, let
me very briefly present Brentano’s tripartite division of acts: all acts of
consciousness are of one of the following type: an act of presentation, in
which the object is simply present to the mind; an act of judging in which
the object’s existence is either affirmed or negated; and an act of interest,
in which the object (both presented and usually judged to exist) is loved or
hated§. It is in the first simple sense in which Meinong’s theory of objects
can be first understood: an object is that which can be thought of. As such,
it must have some sort of being. Which ‘type’ or mode of being it has, must
be ‘decided’ once we know more about that object we are thinking of.
This common principle of the School of Brentano is of crucial impor-
tance in the task to ‘find new concepts’ for QM. As it has been shown in the
previous section, especially considering Pringe’s Kantian interpretation of
Bohr, an ontology that does not allow us to comprehend how the ontologi-
§Cf. Smith (1994:42-4)
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cal domain to which ‘quantum objects’ belong, can be experienced, would
not be a very fruitful enterprise. In this sense, the typical psychological-
ontological parallelism of the School of Brentano should prove interesting:
it is not only a theory about what there is (ontology) what we seek, but also
a theory about how what is can be thought of (psychology). The problem
with the Kantian approach is that it limits experience only to the domain of
what can be empirically intuited, thus closing both ontology and psychol-
ogy to very limited possibilities, and leaving everything else outside of the
‘scientific’ knowable world and relegated to mere metaphysical speculation.
It is important to make a distinction between an object of possible
experience and an object that plays a role in experience. From the Kantian
perspective, we only have experience of spatio-temporal objects, yet, there
are other objects, such as regulative objects or metaphysical objects, which
cannot be experienced, but perform a function in guiding or regulating
experience. Such objects are, for instance, God, the Soul or even Truth,
understood as a regulative idea. The problem arises with the idea that
certain objects that we claim, belong to nature, such as QM-objects would
be, are not objects of possible experience, and all they can do is regulate
or guide our experience of classical objects, which, in its turn, would tell us
something about the domain of QM. The accusation against Kant-Bohr-
Pringe is not that they find no role for these objects which cannot be
experienced, the problem is the claim that there are, in physicial nature,
objects which cannot be experienced and should perform a function similar
to that which performs, for instance, the idea of God.
Let us now move into Meinong’s theory. A good starting point for the
present discussions is Meinong’s ‘prejudice in favor of the actual’. The idea
is that the interest of inquiry has always been so focused on what exists
in the sense in which spatio-temporal objects exists, that a whole domain
of objects of knowledge has been left aside, objects which are in their own
sense. A theory of objects, then, should focus not only in those objects that
exist in such a manner, but in all objects that have some sort of being:
“If we remember how metaphysics has always been conceived as
including in its subject matter the farthest and the nearest, the
greatest and the smallest alike, we may be surprised to be told
that metaphysics cannot take on such a task. It may sound strange
to hear that metaphysics is not universal enough for a science of
Objects, and hence cannot take on the task just formulated. For the
intentions of metaphysics have been universal (a fact which has so
often been disastrous to its success). Without doubt, metaphysics
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has to do with everything that exists. However, the totality of what
exists, including what has existed and will exist, is infinitely small
in comparison with the totality of the Objects of knowledge. This
fact easily goes unnoticed, probably because the lively interest in
reality which is part of our nature tends to favor that exaggeration
which finds the non-real a mere nothing--or, more precisely, which
finds the non-real to be something for which science has no appli-
cation at all or at least no application of any worth” (Meinong,
1981:77)
Meinong’s concern, then, can be said to exceed the preoccupation for
what is ‘real’ or what exists, or that which metaphysics encompasses.
Meinong is concerned with providing a theory that can account for all ob-
jects, i.e., everything that can be thought of. In this sense, there are more
objects than ‘things’. We can think of more things than those that actually
exist. And in a very relevant sense, we can have experience of more objects
than those that exist only in the form of spatio-temporal entitites.
We can approach Meinong’s theory of objects by comparing it with
Russell’s theory of definite descriptions. Historically speaking, Russell can
be considered the victor in a dispute between the two authors, regarding
how to consider the attribution of properties to non-entities:
“Meinong was concerned with the problem of explaining the appar-
ently correct attributions of properties to non-entities, especially in
intensional contexts, and the closely related problem of intension-
ality. It is often said that Russell’s theory of descriptions simply
solved the problem of ascriptions of properties to non-entities; and
this is usually supported by pointing to the Russellian analysis of
non-existence claims as claims about entities” (Routley & Routley,
1973:225).
Let us take the example of Pegasus and the corresponding statement
“Pegasus does not exist”. According to Russell, since logic and hence all
predication is always extensional, no statement can correctly be predicated
of a logical subject that does not exist. So, the statement about Pegasus
should be correctly paraphrased into “The class of existing items does not
include Pegasus”. We can see here how the second statement does not have
Pegasus as its logical subject, but the set of existing things. Given that Pe-
gasus does not exist, I cannot correctly attribute it with any property at all,
not even non-existence. Now, the consequence of the Russellian approach
is that I cannot predicate anything at all of a non-existing entity. Thus,
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the statement “Pegasus is a winged horse”, given how there is no Pegasus,
must be considered false, the same as the statement “Pegasus is identical
to Pegasus”. This ‘solution’ offered by Russell and accepted by the analytic
tradition of philosophy of language has as a consequence the impossibility
of predicating of anything that does not exist. Now, this logical maneuver
carried out by Russell can, of course, be considered legitimate and suiting
very specific purposes. It goes along great, for example, with a positivist
ontology as the one assumed nowadays, but it falls short for pretty much
any other purpose:
“While such a ’solution’ to the problem of the attribution of prop-
erties to non-entities might be satisfactory for a few limited pur-
poses, for many purposes it is not. Russell’s theory does not even
begin to provide a solution to the main problems which concerned
Meinong, viz. that of obtaining a satisfactory account and expla-
nation of truth (or factuality) in intensional discourse, and of the
logical behaviour of subjects, descriptions and quantified expres-
sions in intensional discourse, of explaining the apparent truth of
some statements about non-entities and the peculiarity or falsity
of others, and of obtaining a non-Platonistic account of mathemat-
ics.” (Routley & Routley, 1973:226)
Meinong’s solution to this problem runs in a very different line. Rather
than denying the possibility of attributing properties to non-entities,
Meinong proposes quite a different principle to start from, the so called
“principle of independence of being-so (Sosein) from being (Sein)” and it
states as follows: “The Object is by nature indifferent to being, although
at least one of its two Objectives of being, the Object’s being or non-being,
subsist” (Meinong, 1960: 82 and 86 respectively). We can know an object,
we can think about it, predicate of it, without yet knowing whether or not
the object exists. Things are said to exist when they do so in space-time.
In this sense, all of mathematics is able to predicate from objects that do
not exist.
An object is a simple unit; it can be a part of an objective, which is
Meinong’s term for what is usually known as a state of affairs, a complex
‘situation’. For example, the golden mountain is an object, “the golden
mountain is made of gold” is an objective. The golden mountain does not
exist, yet the just stated objective subsists. “Why doesn’t the golden moun-
tain exist?”, one might ask. And Meinong’s answer would be “because it’s
made of gold and there are no such things as golden mountains”. Yet we only
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know that golden mountains do not exist, because we understand what a
golden mountain is, we can grasp the object ‘golden mountain’: “If I should
be able to judge that a certain Object is not, then I appear to have had to
grasp the Object in some way beforehand, in order to say anything about
its not-being, or more precisely, in order to affirm or deny the ascription of
non being to the Object” (Meinong, 1960:84).
Now, regarding certain other objects, such as the round square, we can-
not attribute them with any kind of being. They are, in fact, Aussersein
or outside being. Yet, for Meinong, unlike for Russell, round squares are
indeed round and square, hence we know they are impossible objects. The
objective “round squares are impossible figures” subsists. This objective has
a being so, inasmuch as it subsists, even if the object, the round square,
must be attributed with not-being. Compare this with Russell, for whom
round squares are neither round nor square, since the class of existing items
does not comprise such entities, nothing can be predicated of them with
truth.
We can see the elements of Meinong’s ontology in the following chart:
The most important consequence of Meinong’s theory of objects, at
least for our present purposes, is that it allows to know and describe ob-
jects without a prior commitment to its existence. The domain of being
is expanded beyond existence, allowing for science to inquire into objects
that do not exist in the way of spatio-temporal things, but rather have a
different kind of being, they subsist:
“The first distinctive thesis of Meinong’s theory is that very many
objects do not exist in any way at all. Nevertheless we can make
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true statements in which such objects occur as proper subjects.
Since the term ’object’ carries no existential commitment, the stan-
dard attempt to represent Meinong’s theory as a Platonistic theory
or as a levels-of-existence theory is, on the face of it, seriously mis-
taken in the case of ground-floor objects at least. Thus one very
important feature which Meinong’s theory shares with any thor-
oughgoing and genuinely non-existential logic is the rejection of the
Ontological Assumption (OA), the view embodied in all standard
modern logical theories and most empiricist theories (e.g. Hume),
that one cannot make true statements about what does not exist.
Alternatively, the OA is the thesis that a non-entity cannot be the
proper subject of a true statement (where the proper subject con-
trasts with the apparent subject which is eliminated under analysis
into canonical form). The OA was explicitly rejected in Meinong’s
Independence Thesis (IT) stating the independence of Sosein from
Sein: according to the thesis an item’s having properties does not
imply its existence” (Routley & Routley, 1973:227).
I’d like to offer a brief presentation of two more concepts that are central
to Meinong’s theory of object and could prove useful in the following sec-
tion. The first one is the concept of incomplete object. A complete object is,
paradigmatically, a thing, a spatio-temporal entity. They are complete both
in the ontological and gnoseological senses. An object is complete when it is
completely determined in all its properties regarding all its relations with
all other objects. In other words, a complete object is the one that has
a determined answered for all questions posed in terms of the law of the
excluded middle. From the gnoseological side, a complete object is that of
which I can know all is properties, all its determinations. This glass of water
next to me, for instance, is a complete object. When I ask “is it transpar-
ent?” I answer “yes”, “is it 10cm tall?”, yes. . . and so on. The object is
determined in every sense, even if I do not know all of its properties, in
principle I could, or if I don’t it is due to empirical reasons and not due to
a natural impediment of the object.
An incomplete object, on the other hand, is that which is not determined
regarding all of its properties. This means, not only that one does not know
these attributes, but that indeed the object is, in an ontological sense,
undetermined. Excluded middle does not apply to it. For example, the
abstract circle described by an Euclidean geometry is not determined as to
its size, its color, its texture, its location, etc. It is not that these properties
are unknown, they are simply not in the object. I could not know, for
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example, that the circle’s area is pi.r2, yet the object is determined in
this respect, whereas the color of the circle is not something unknown, but
undetermined. It is just a property that the abstract geometrical circle does
not possess.
An object that is either determined or undetermined will also be
(un)determined in its mode of being:
“An object which is completely determined in its Being-So (So-
sein), is also completely determined in its mode of Being (Sein).
Correspondingly that object which is incompletely determined in
its Being-So, is also incompletely determined in its Being. Of the
incomplete object A, which is not determined as to its Being, it
cannot be stated ‘A is’ or ‘A is not’. It is still possible that it
is and that it is not. Here again, possibility is a third alternative
to the two contradictory factuality determinations and, moreover,
something definitely positive. The indeterminateness of incomplete
objects with respect to factuality of Being and Being-So is wholly
compatible with their determinateness as to the possibility of Be-
ing and Being-So. Thus, though factuality cannot be attributed to
incomplete objects, possibility may. The freedom of the incomplete
objects from the law of the excluded middle enables them to be the
‘carriers’ (Trger) of ‘pure possibilities”’ (Michaelis, 1942:401).
Which brings us to the second and last concept I wish to introduce,
that is, the concept of possibility. “Possibility is a quantitative property
which can be intensified up to the limit of factuality” (Michaelis, 1942:397),
meaning that possibility can be thought of as a line that goes from impos-
sibility to factuality/actuality. Possibility is predicated not upon objects
themselves, but upon objectives; one should not say “A is (not) possible”,
but “it is (not) possible that A”. Then, in one extreme of the possibility
line, we would find all the objectives that have as components completely
undetermined objects, contradictory objects such as the round square. In
‘the middle’ of the line, we would find incomplete objects, such as mathe-
matical entities or objects that are probabilistic in their own nature; until
the other extreme of the line, where determined, complete objects, that is,
spatio-temporal things, are found.
To conclude this section, the aim of which was no other than to offer
a schematic presentation of some of the rudiments of Meinong’s ontology
in the hope they can be applied to some of the issues of QM in the fol-
lowing section, we can state that Meinong’s theory of objects takes as a
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starting point the concept of object, that what can be thought of, and frees
objects from the restraint of existence in the task of knowledge; meaning
that there is a realm of being that goes beyond existence/actuality that can
be scientifically known. Objectives can be composed both by real existing
objects or inexistent objects. In both cases we say of objectives that they
subsist. Finally, objects can be either complete or incomplete in the strong
ontological sense, and depending on this, we will find them in one place or
another of the possibility line, which again, is an ontological possibility and
not an epistemic one.
3. A Meinongian ontology for QM
In this section I would like to apply some of the Meinongian concepts pre-
sented in the previous section, to some of the main interpretative problems
in QM. In particular, I will address quantum superpositions.
Quantum superpositions, also known in the literature as “Schro¨dinger’s
cats” raise a series of difficulties that concern not only the discussions in
foundations of QM, but also the theory itself. The problem regarding su-
perpositions, according to (da Costa & de Ronde, 2013), is that they seem
to violate the principle of non-contradiction when establishing mutually ex-
clusive terms as in for example α| ↑ 〉+ β| ↓ 〉. Moreover, a further problem
appears at the time of determining what objective physical process is re-
sponsible for the measurement outcome of only one of the terms; this is
known as the “measurement problem”. These problems are yet without an
accepted solution and, according to de Ronde, the way to solve them lies
not within the insistence on the ‘measurement problem’, on trying to find
a way to classically justify the measurement outcomes, which are always
taken as a starting, legitimizing point, but rather, by looking into the su-
perpositions themselves. All attempts are guided by the will to understand
QM in classical terms, by ignoring that there are, in fact, superpositions
as described by the quantum formalism, but also being used for the most
diverse technological applications¶.
This misguided approach rests, among others, in one metaphysical sup-
position that is operating in every attempt to interpret QM, that is, that
reality equals actuality. In other words, that something can only be consid-
ered as real, as ‘truly existent’, with ontological density, if and only if that
something is in the mode of the actual. Actual here must be understood as
¶See de Ronde 2015B, specially 25-6.
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a metaphysical mode of being, that in which the object in question is com-
pletely determined in every respect, as it is the case of physical bodies in
classical Newtonian physics. But, “if we are willing to discuss the possibility
that ‘Quantum Physical Reality Actuality’, then there is plenty of space
to interpret and represent quantum superpositions in terms of (non-actual)
physical reality” (de Ronde, 2015B:3). What would it mean for ‘quantum
physical reality’ to be different from actuality?
An answer can be sought in Meinong’s ontology, as I have presented
it in the previous section. To begin with, we can consider any definition
of a quantum superposition, as the one quoted above, to be a subsisting
objective in the Meinongian sense. We mean by this two things. First, that
the state of superposition as such should not be thought of as an object,
but as an objective. Remember that objectives are, for Meinong, states of
affairs, complex objects, made of objects. Hence, in α| ↑ 〉+β| ↓ 〉 we find the
terms | ↑ 〉 and | ↓ 〉 as being the objects that conform the whole objective.
Second, by saying that the entire objective subsists, we are saying that it
has a specific mode of being, that is not the mode of being of existent actual
things, and we are also saying, that we need not worry (yet) about whether
or not the objects that compose this objective, the terms in the equation,
exist or not; because, as explained in the previous section, judgments about
existence are independent of other judgments we can make about objectives.
Superpositions are contradictory only when thought from the perspec-
tive of what is actual. But we could understand the wave function, a com-
plex objective which has several bases, some of which are states of su-
perpositions, as being an incomplete object. Now, incomplete objects are
undetermined not only in a subjective sense, in the sense that we don’t
know certain properties it has, but also in an ontological sense, that is, in-
complete objects are indeed undetermined regarding many of its properties.
This indetermination is only a problem, again, if we want the wave func-
tion to be a complete object and more precisely a spatio-temporal thing
that exists in the same sense as Newtonian particles do. But are we not, in
this way, calling for unnecessary problems? Why insist in a metaphysical
principle, which as such cannot be demonstrated, if it turns out to make
any coherent interpretation impossible?
According to Meinong possibility is a line that goes from impossibility
to actuality. What if the domain that QM describes does not belong to the
realm of actuality, but to that of pure possibility?:
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A first consequence of this way of interpreting the problem would be
that: the superpositions problems should be investigated separately from
the measurement problem. By this I mean, one issue is understanding mea-
surement in the sense of ‘actualization’ of quantum states, that is, one issue
is the relation there is between the domain of reality described by QM and
how that domain becomes actual in a measurement. But the wave func-
tion, as described by QM, should constitute an independent and legitimate
problem for quantum theory, one that should be understood in terms of
possibility, rather than actuality. Thinking of as an incomplete object al-
lows to understand that there is nothing contradictory in the expression
of a superposition state. At the same time, if ‘real’, in the sense of strong
being, in the sense of ‘what really is’, is separated from what is actual, al-
lowing to enlarge the domain of relevant being beyond actuality, then, the
wave function, understood as an incomplete object, can be said to be in its
own right, even if it doesn’t exist in the sense of the actual. This being of
the wave function, now in the mode of possibility rather than actuality, is
from a Meinongian perspective a legitimate domain of being, in the relevant
sense that it is a domain susceptible of scientific inquiry.
Following this line of thought, the primordial question should no longer
be “how does nature decide the result of a measurement given a superpo-
sition?”, but, rather, “what is a superposition and what can it do besides
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being actualized in a measurement?” It is not that the process of actualiza-
tion through measurement were irrelevant or unimportant for QM, but it
seems that some previous knowledge is necessary in order to tackle it. We
do not yet fully understand what a superposition is, but we do have the
formalism, and also the possibility of grounding this understanding in a dif-
ferent ontology from the one of classical Newtonian mechanics. By taking
the realm of possibility seriously, and the independence of being-so from
being, I believe, we can start seeking for new physical concepts that allow
the proper comprehension.
We can seek for these concepts now, not in terms of complete deter-
mined actual classical objects, but with a different ontology. We can think
of superpositions as incomplete objects. This change allows superpositions
to bear “mutually contradictory properties” without collapsing understand-
ing. The relevant question would be now, not how one term of the equation
appears instead of the other in a measurement outcome, but, for instance,
how do different superposition states, none of them actualized, become ‘en-
tangled’ and interact with one another? If this occurs independently of a
measurement process, as it seems to be the case, then we need to begin
to understand that these curious states have objective physical properties
that are entirely independent of actuality.
Superpositions and the wave function must be understood in their own
right. This means we need to find the metaphysical principles that allow for
their comprehension regardless of the domain of actuality. In this sense, de
Ronde proposes to replace the classical Aristotelian metaphysical principles
upon which classical physics are based, for the principles that spring from
the quantum theory: instead of the Aristotelian principles of Existence (that
being is being is the mode of the Aristotelian entity, as a space-time unity,
a complete object in the Meinongian sense); of non-contradiction, and of
identity (that is, the identity of an entity through time); instead of said
principles, “This realm [the realm of QM] is defined by the principles of
indetermination, superposition and difference” (de Ronde, 2015:26). This
means that to understand what constitutes a quantum object; we need to
define it according to the principles proper to the domain it belongs, the
domain of QM, the domain of possibility; and not in terms of actuality.
Conclusions
I have argued in favor of a realist approach to the problem of the interpre-
tation of QM and, following that line, I have offered some arguments as to
why such problem should be sought to be solved from a perspective that
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prioritizes the quantum formalism and the elements proper of the theory
that have led to so much experimental and technological success, over those
orthodox interpretations that seek to maintain all physical understanding
within the limits of classical physics. Having accepted then the need for new
ontological concepts that could allow for such an interpretation, I have of-
fered a brief presentation of Meinong’s theory of objects. In particular, the
concepts of subsistence, possibility and incomplete objects, open, I believe,
the opportunity to consider that the wave function, as a sort of ‘quantum
object’, belongs to a different mode of being than that of actuality. I do not
claim to have found here any revolutionary results, but only to have offered
some basic ontological considerations in order to guide the discussion in the
foundations of QM. In this sense, I believe that Meinong’s ontology allows
for a scientific comprehension of objects that do not exist in the mode of the
actual, and that these objects could be the objects of QM. If this is true,
the only result I have to offer is an indication as to how to proceed in the
quest to comprehend quantum reality: that is, not in its constant reference
to measurements and actuality, but as a legitimate domain in itself.
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